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The evolution of the welfare state dictates increasing requirements in addressing
the health care needs of the population. Coupled with rising health care costs and
tighter budget controls, the need for changes in the traditional ways health care has
been provided become widespread. On the economics front, such reforms created a
boost in the health economics literature. Research in the field is expanding, as more
countries engage in large scale reforms of their health care delivery and financing.
Unlike other fields of economics, institutional design to provide health care
to populations varies widely across countries. A marked difference between the
US and Europe exists. While in the United States there is relatively more reliance
than in other countries on private financing and delivery mechanisms, Western
Europe is still dominated by Government dominance in financing. Moreover, in
many European countries, we can still find generalized Government delivery as
well, through the so-called National Health Service.
With the aim of bringing together the concerns and promote the sharing of
agendas of researchers on both sides of the Atlantic, the Faculdade de Economia
(Universidade Nova de Lisboa) hosted a workshop on health economics, sponsored
by Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian.
This special issue, also kindly sponsored by Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian,
collects three papers representative of the convergence of research interests in Eu-
rope and the US. Namely, the effects of distinct payment systems on allocation of
resources. They offer complementary views of the broad research agenda.
The first paper, by William Encinosa, III, reports the implications of public
financing of health care expenditures. It introduces the notions of extensive-margin
and intensive margin effects. The relative strength of these effects may lead to
push-out or crowd-in phenomena.
While the first one is traditional in the health economics literature, the second
one has been neglected. The results obtained show that such omission does limit
our understanding of how private and public financing mechanisms for health care
interact, in particular whenever parts of the population are insured.
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The second paper, by Rosella Levaggi and Lise Rochaix, discusses the payment
system for physicians. This discussion differs from previous ones, which mostly
addressed hospital payments, while still sharing some other features. The main new
aspect is the possibility of substitution between equipment (capital) and effort in
the production of medical care, under two different sources of uncertainty, when
comparing payment systems.
The paper highlights how selection incentives (choosing special groups of pa-
tients) may differ according to the chosen payment system. In particular, under
the fee-for-service regime, since controlling moral hazard requires that an infor-
mational rent is given to the physician, the latter has preference for patients with
a high probability to be sick. On the opposite side, under a capitation system, the
usual incentive for selection takes place and the physician prefers to treat low risk
patients.
To simultaneously address both moral hazard and adverse selection, the authors
define a special type of mixed payment system: it includes a state-contingent reward.
The authors show this payment system, although improving upon the polar cases
of fee-for-service and capitation, to be a second-best solution. This is so because it
still entails an information rent to the physician and no effort sharing across health
states is possible.
In the third paper, Carla Gomes addresses the empirical issue of how strong are
the financial incentives created by the different payment systems. The empirical
measurement proposed is important, at least, on two grounds. First, it provides a
quantitative view of the role of managed care plans. As these plans are similar
to health care provision institutions that appeared recently in several European
countries, the results are also relevant to Europe as well.
To identify the effect of the payment system, Gomes uses a “differences-in-
differences-in-differences” approach. This is novel and reveals strong effects in the
health care provision of mental care associated with the payment mechanism. Other
diseases show much less clear results.
All three papers raise important questions. Several issues remain unsettled. This
should spur future research in the area, leading to a better understanding of health
care provision and financing specificities
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